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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
APPELLATE'S REPLY
BRIEF
OREM CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee
V.

TODD BOVO
Defendant/Appellant

:

Case No. 20020673-CA
Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT TODD BOVO
Appeal from a judgment and conviction of Disorderly Conduct, a
class C misdemeanor in violation of section 76-6-45 of the Utah Code, and
Reckless Driving a class B misdemeanor in violation of section 41-6-45 of
the Utah Code in the Fourth District Court, State of Utah, Utah County,
Orem Department, the Honorable John Backlund, Judge presiding.
TODD BOVO
Defendant Pro Se
300 West 745 South
Orem, Utah 84058
(801)735-8510
Pro Se Defendant/Appellant
Robert Church
Orem City Prosecutor
City Attorney's Office
56 North State Street
Orem, Utah 84058
r

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ARGUMENT
This reply brief will follow the order of arguments in the Brief of
Appellee. Critical parts of the trial record are included in the Appellant's
reply brief.
Issue I:

THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL.

This court should find that Mr. Bovo made adequate trial motions for
the request for a trial by jury. According to Rule 12 (a) of U.R.C.P., a
motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing
unless the court otherwise permits. Is the arraignment not a hearing? Mr.
Bovo motioned on the record at the arraignment for a jury and the City
contends that the motion never occurred (appellee brief p.7). Under this
argument the City is stating that anything that transpires inside the
courtroom is moot unless an action is in writing prior to the proceeding. If
that is true then that would mean that the judge had no jurisdiction.
The language used by the trial judge clearly indicated that the charges
would be amended to infractions. "So this would be tried as if they were
both infractions, then.'Xarraignment p.6) It cannot be ignored that the
defendant was told the charges would be amended by the trial judge and
there would be absolutely no possibility of being convicted of the
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misdemeanor crimes, or serving jail time. The judge also stated, "I haven't
put anybody in jail for reckless driving in 18 years"(arraignment p.5). But
the defendant was sentenced to six months in jail. Although the sentence of
six months in jail was not fully served the judgement should not trump itself
because the jail time served was not totaling six months. The indirect
consequences of the sentence still affect the defendant.
The city argues that the court never relieved the defendant with
compliance to Rule 17(d). However the court itself failed to comply with
the rule. When the judge ordered that the charges be amended then and only
then would the defendant have been legally denied a trial by j ury. In plain
doctrine the rule states "No jury should be allowed in the trial of an
infraction (Rule 17[d]). The charges were never amended to infractions.
The City acknowledges that the defendant was proceeding pro se, and
the defendant accepted the responsible to comply with the rules of the court
and criminal procedure. In spite of this information pro se defendants
should not be held up to recognize the lower court's own set of
abbreviations. The defendant had complied with calendar dates to his
appearance. He prepared pre-trial motions and addressed the court
respectfully and courteously. He just wanted his day in court. He wanted
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the opportunity to present his case in his own defense. After the arraignment
the defendant had been given an information sheet. At the bottom of the
information the abbreviations NJT were hand written by the court clerk. The
defendant assumed and according to his requests that July 19, 2002 was the
date of the pre-trial hearing. The defendant asked the court clerk outside the
court if the writing at the bottom of the information sheet-"HEARING
SCHEDULE IN OPEN COURT: NJT."(addendum A) meant a pre-trial
hearing. She told him it did mean a pre-trial hearing. Once again the
defendant acknowledges his limited legal knowledge and resources, but the
defendant should not be held up to the court's own abbreviations. Had the
abbreviation been written in full plain English-such to say- nonjury trial- the
defendant would have been able to come prepared for a trial and not a pretrial hearing. Mr. Bovo motioned for an enlargement of time because of this
discrepancy but his motion was denied (trial p.8).
Issue II

THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CHARGES. AND
THE APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL.

The City argues that there is harmless discrepancies of the testimony
offered by the City's witnesses that the defendant mouthed "you're going to
pay" (trial p.14) vs. "you'll pay" (trial p.38). It is imperative to note that the
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defendant was charged with a misdemeanor from this one alleged
"Mouthing." One phrase that was neither seen nor hear by either officer on
scene, (trial p. 68). It is not a harmless discrepancy to charge and arrest a
person with a misdemeanor crime without the evidence necessary to hold the
defendant up to the charges. The defendant was not asked to desist in either
action. Because of this discrepancy the rights of the defendant were severly
compromised.
Furthermore it must be noted that the City contends that it is the
responsibility of the defendant to present every scrap of competent evidence
to support the verdict. However the defendant was unable to present the
facts to his defense. In the City's opening brief the City further recognizes
that the trial was obviously biased. The City contends that Mr. Bovo
"ignored the instruction and continued his line of questioning in the manner
which was improper and objected to by the prosecutor "(appeellee brief
p. 12).
MR. BOVO: Did you see other units pass by the scene?
O. BINGHAM: It is possible that other units drove by. However,
they did not stop. That's of no consequence.
MR. BOVO: Did you see other units pass by?
MS. JENSEN: Objection
THE COURT: Sustained
(trial p.64)
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The City argues that this was a proper objection to a question already
asked and answered that the Judge properly sustained. Officer Bingham
never answered the question. He said that, "it is possible." But that did not
answer Mr. Bovo's question of whether he saw other units drive by. Mr.
Bovo wasn't asking if, "it was possible." Mr. Bovo, having never been
involved with law enforcement, felt swooped down by a force of at least six
officers. This was an intimidating show of force. The City also listed the
following testimony in the opening brief.
MR. BOVO: Have you ever fabricated information to—
MS. JENSEN: Objection
THE COURT: Sustained
Once again the City challenges that this was a proper objection
because the defendant had no good faith basis that the officer had ever
fabricated information, and that the question was not relevant. However, as
shown in the trial transcript the Officer admitted to a "misrepresentation"
from the very first question Mr. Bovo asked him (trial p.56).
MR. BOVO: In your report you stated that you were patrolling 400
South and observed a green Honda. Was there two Hondas at the scene?
O. BINGHAM: No, there was not.
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MR. BOVO: So was the Honda that I was driving the green Honda
that you observed?
O. BINGHAM: What portion of the report does it say that?
MR. BOVO: At the very beginning on the third, fourth line.
O.BINGHAM: Fourth paragraph?
MR. BOVO: Fourth line of the first paragraph.
O. BINGHAM: Oh, I'm sorry. There was only one Honda.
MR. BOVO: So it wasn't the green Honda, it was the blue Honda?
O. BINGHAM: That would be correct.
MR. BOVO: So it's jus a mis—
O. BINGHAM: It was a misrepresentation.
The Officer reported multiple mistakes as listed above, but Mr. Bovo
wasn't allowed to question the officer as to points that were very
consequential. Observing the correct vehicle in a reckless driving charge is
vital. The line of questioning was not allowed by the Court. The response
of the judge was as follows:
MR. BOVO: I just want to make sure.
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THE COURT: No, I just want to make sure. Is this the way the trial
is going to go? I mean, you're going over points that are not very
consequential, are they?
MR. BOVO: I think observing them—
THE COURT: I mean it's obvious to me in your questioning of the
witnesses you don't dispute that you were involved in something with this
young lady. You have your version and she has hers. But now you want to
spend about ten minutes questioning the officer about the license place on
your car. So if you want to just tell me. I need to know, is this the way this
trial is going to go?
MR. BOVO: Absolutely not. My line of questioning is, according to
state and federal law, in order to stop a vehicle in a n infraction it needs to be
witnessed. I'm trying to find out what the officer had witnessed it. (trial
p.58).
As illustrated Mr. Bovo had good reason to believe that information
was enhanced, or frabricated, because of the inconsistencies with what
transpired and his report, as well as the report of Officer Healy. Once again
Mr. Bovo did not abuse his court privileges and was expedient in his
questioning, but was denied all the same.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Bovo's trial and pre-trial objections and motions furnish amply
basis to reach the pre-motive requirements discussed in the Appellant
opening brief and in the reply brief. If this court finds inadequate motions
and objections were made on these points, the pre-motive issue should be
ruled on pursuant to the doctrine of plain error.
The errors the trial court made during the trial were harmful in that it
improperly bolstered the City's witnesses, which provided a powerful tool
against the appellant in key points. There is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for Mr. Bovo absent the errors presented by City, and
the trial Court.
As the Appellant's pre-trial Motion To Dismiss stated, this is a person
with no previous criminal history with a clean driving record. The Appellant
is not asking for clemency, only that the judicial system defend his civil
rights. Mr. Bovo has no previous legal training or education and has crafted
these briefs through his own intensive research. He would be willing to
testify at oral argument if so needed. In the light of the foregoing, and for
the reasons set forth in these briefs, Mr. Bovo respectfully requests this court
to reverse and remand to the trial court.
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Defendant Pro Se/Appellant
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Prosecutor
(
) with counsel
Defendant present ( / ) pro se
( v ~ ) Advised of Rights and Penalties
(
) Reading Waived,
Defendant given information
( . / ) Read
) Given 2nd and 3rd Offense Warning in Open Court.
Defendant acknowledged (s) he understands rights and penalties (
) Request for counsel denied.
COUNSEL APPOINTED. SEE REVERSE SIDE. (
) Defendant in custody of (
) Sheriff
(
)OPD
(
) Other
RELEASE DEFENDANT ROR.
(
Cash / Bond / Surety.
(
) Remand into custody of
BAIL SET AT $
.Cash/Bond/Surety.
) Defendant failed to appear.
(
) Warrant with bail at $ .
days /months. Review after
.days.
( ) No Review
) Non-Bailable Warrant in Aid of Commitment for
FORFEIT IN DISPOSITION (
) SODC
FORFEIT BAIL BOND. (
) FORFEIT CASH BAIL.
) FORFEIT FOR FTA. (
Defendant found Non-Compliant. Probation is revoked and terminated
XJNT1
XJNT2
XJNT3
centered by

-V- '

(

) defendant

(

Plea
/ V O
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/\'G
Plea
) defense counsel (
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) court

COUNT 4
COUNT 5
COUNT 6
(
) accepted after factual basis given.

1-800-642-351

Plea
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) Defense waived right to timely imposition of sentence. (
) Defendant requested time for EOP / Sentence
Suspended
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»UNT1 Fine of.
/
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UNT 3 Fine of
/
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UNT 4 Fine of
/
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SUSPENSIONS ARE CONTINGENT UPON DEFENDANTS COMPLIANCE WITH THIS ORDER.
(
) Credit for time served
FINE and FEES PLUS INTERESTdue by
RESTITUTION due by
.(
) Court reserves jurisdiction regarding restitution.
s and fees to be paid
(
) to the clerk of court
(
) as directed by Adult Probation.*
) Defendant to make monthly payments of $
beginning
. and continuing until paid in full.
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SEE REVERSE SIPE

_) Defendant is on probation for
months (
) Unsupervised
(
) Intervention
(
) AP & P
Report to Adult Probation for Pre-Sentence Report by.
2ALL INTERVENTION WITHIN 24 HOURS OF SENTENCING
(
) GO TO POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR PROCESSING
P H Q L / DRUG TREATMENT
SEE REVERSE SIDE
__) Defendant is ordered to pay $
Alcohol Education Fee by
BAC
J Defendant is ORDERED TO TAKE THIS FORM and REPORT to the UTAH COUNTY DIVISION OF HUMAN SERVICES.
J Complete Alcohol / Substance Abuse / Domestic Violence Evaluation by
J Anger Management Class through UVSC (764-7580)
(
) Life Skills Class through UVSC
(
) Contact DCFS (374-7898)
J Provide proof of completion to court (
) Continue present counseling (
) Treatment as Ordered (
) Court reserves jurisdiction over treatment
J Pay Utah County Division of Human Services directly for evaluation / classes / Alcohol Education Fee.
J STATE FUND to pay for evaluation / classes
idant to (
) have no drug / alcohol related charges (
) use no alcohol or controlled substances (
) submit to blood / urine / drug / alcohol tests.
(
) Not associate with anyone using controlled substance or paraphernalia

QRPER; (Can WKhin Qn? WeeK To 3<?h9-ute M Tim?).
. days by m
J Report to the UTAH COUNTY JAIL and serve
) Work Diversion Program (
) Work Release. (
) Work Search.
)
Days Home Confinement through INTERVENTION (SEE REVERSE SIDE).
) To be completed by
in
. hours increments. Defendant Phone #
be served (
) CONCURRENT (
) CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER CASE. Defendant to provide proof of completion.
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SEE REVERSE ?|DE

) Community service granted. Defendant to complete
Go to counter for referral. Defendant to provide proof of completion. (

.0 CONTACT WITH VICTIMS
NIG SCHEDULE IN OPEN CpU
3
BY PROMISE
ROMIS( TO APPE
irrest.

hours in lieu of fine / jail by
) Serve Through United Way - 374-2588

PROTECTIVE ORDER SERVED ON DEFENDANT
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realize that if I fail to appear, the Court may proceed in my absence and a warrant may issue
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT- OREM COURT -•
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
2CJ2 JUL 10 A 10 1 1

OREM CITY,
PLANTIFF

vs.
CASE No. 025204324 TC
TODD FRANK BOVO,
DEFENDANT

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Todd F. Bovo charges should be dismissed based on the totality of the
circumstances. The government has charged the defendant in violation of Section 41-6-45
Reckless driving. This charge is clearly wrong because this is a subjective offense, based
on the discretion of the citing officer, and not based on hearsay evidence. Only when a
police officer observes a violation of a misdemeanor (or an infraction) is he or she
empowered to make an arrest, People v. Superior Court! Cal.3d. 186,200 (1972). The
alleged offenses were observed solely by the complainant, and no officer witnessed a

single moving violation. Such a case can be made in the event of personal injury or
property damage, however, neither occurred in this situation. Todd was also charged
under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1973), Disorderly Conduct. However,
subsection 76-9-102 (3) states, "disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the
offense continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction." No
person requested the defendant to desist. Also, the arresting officer failed to ascertain
whether the offense was committed in his presence, so as to justify a warrantless arrest.
The officer did not observe the alleged offense through the use of any of his own senses,
and based his findings on that of the witness on scene. Although probable cause is
justified in felony charges, misdemeanor "probably cause" or "probable suspicion" exists
when the facts and circumstances are observed by the officer through the officer's senses
and are sufficient to warrant an officer of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is
occurring. Also, the government failed to comply with Miranda v. Arizona, 344 U.S. 436
(1966). All statements should be suppressed because of the violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due to the preponderance and lack of credible evidence both charges should
be dismissed.

DECLARATION
1. Todd F. Bovo is the defendant in the above-entitled action.
2. At about 18:45 hours, April 6,2002, Defendant was stopped at 100 North after being
followed by officers for approximately a mile.
3. While driving, he was accompanied by my brother ADAM A. BOVO who would have
been able to testify on my behalf to the alleged incident, however, he is currently
employed as a forestfirefighteron a "Hot Shot" crew and is unable to be contacted due to
the remote locations where he works. Also,ridingas a passenger was TROY L. BOVO,
army first class, and UVSC student. Lastly, Zesty, a pure-bred-yellow-Labrador was
being carried in the vehicle. Zesty is owned by Guide Dogs for the Blind in San Rafel
California. Todd is a volunteer in the program to train Zesty of the basic commands to

guide a blind person. At the time of the incident Zesty was wearing her identifying green
jacket as she always does whenever she accompanies him in public places.
4. At the time of the traffic stop the defendant was ordered out of the vehicle because
officers believed he may try to flee the stop. This was not a one-officer arrest He was
swooped down upon by a combined team of at least six officers. This intimidating team
came armed not only with guns, but also with other signs of power. This defendant, for
whom there is no indication of prior experience with police or with the criminal justice
system was held incommunicado at which time he was subjected to isolation,
interrogation, alternating threats, by confrontational abusive officers.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Argument
Defendant argues that both the evidence and the statements relating to the charges should
be dismissed under the totality of the circumstances.
I. RECKLESS DRIVING, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-45 of the
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which the City of Orem has adopted by Section 19-1-1, in
that, the defendant did drive a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property. The most serious of all driving-related misdemeanors. Reckless
driving is covered in one of the most worded statues in the Vehicle Code. This offense is
a "discretionary arrest" misdemeanor, based on the observations of the citing officer.
The misdemeanor arrest rule in Utah provides that a police officer may make a
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor offense if the misdemeanor is committed in the
officer's presence. This rule does not apply when a motor vehicle accident has occurred.
No accident or injury occurred in this situation. The purpose of the presence
requirement is to prevent warrantless arrests based on information from third parties.
State v. Jensen, 351 N. W. 2d 29 (Minn. App. 1984). In ascertaining whether an offense
is being committed in an officer's presence, the officer may take into account what the
officer observes through use of any of his or her senses. State v. Forsythe 194 W.Va.

496,460 S.E.2d 194,197-98 Ct App 1985). The officer is not limited to his sense of
vision alone, i.e., it is not necessary for the officer to have actually seen every fact
constituting the commission of the misdemeanor, but he may utilize all of his
senses... .thus a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of an officer when, with the
aid of all his senses and what is common knowledge under the circumstances, the officer
has knowledge that such is the case, Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1 e, at
23-24 (3d.ed. 1996). Not only must the officer perceive through his or her senses that an
offense is being committed, but the officer must also have a reasonable ground to infer
that the suspect is committing an unlawfiil act to meet the probable cause requirement
Probable cause to justify a misdemeanor arrest exists when the facts and circumstances as
observed by the officer through the officer's senses are sufficient to warrant an officer of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense is occurring. Warren, 103 N. M. at 475-76,
709 P2& at 197*98. (noting use of officer's "sensory perceptions" to meet the "in
presence" requirement). Although, Officer Bingham witnessed the defendant vehicle
travel approximately one mile, he did not witness a single moving violation, infraction or
misdemeanor, nor did any other Orem City Police Officer. Thus, the stop which Officer
Bingham made was an investigatory stop; therefore, probable cause for stopping is the
issue, and Officer Bingham had no "probable cause" witnessed in his presence to warrant
an investigatory stop. Lastly, this charge is incorrect because two of the alleged moving
violations are not found under Title 41, chapter six as the law states, "following another
vehicle—safe distance, does not apply to vehicle speeds of less than 35 miles per hour."
The witness testified in her statement that she was traveling 25 miles an hour and the
defendant was behind her the whole time. Defendant argues a lack of reasonable
grounds to stop him. Where there are unreasonable grounds supporting a warrantless
arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor, the arrest is not valid, and is therefore a
violation of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure.
II. Defendant argues that both his statements and the evidence relating to the charges
should be suppressed under Miranda, under 18 USCS §3501 (c). Miranda requires (1)
that before interrogation, the person in custody must be informed clearly that he has the
right to remain silent and that anything he says will be used against him in court; (2) that
the person in custody must be informed clearly of therightto consult with a lawyer and

have one present during interrogation; and (3) that a lawyer will be appointed for the
person in custody if he is not able to afford to pay a lawyer. The District Attorney
acknowledges that Defendant was not informed of his right to remain silent until after his
statements. A Police officer does not have to give me a Miranda warning if he stops
someone for a traffic violation so long as the police officer simply asks a motorist for
identification and limits discussion to the traffic offense for which the officer stopped the
motorist. A motorist's statement to a police officer relating to events leading up to a
ticket is therefore admissible even if the officer did not give the motorist the Miranda
warning. However, a Miranda warning would be required if an officer detains a motorist
in order to question the motorist about crimes unrelated to the traffic stop. Officer
Healey was stated he was talking with the complaintant to investigate the defendant
contacting her in the future, with harassment or threats.

Without Miranda or §3501, the court would look at the totality of the circumstances as in
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). In the case before the court today, Mr.
Todd F. Bovo is a man with no previous history with the criminal justice system. He did
sound his horn and flash his lights to another motorist who was driving well below the
speed limit while talking on her cell phone and she was clearly not paying attention to
driving her vehicle. He did not violate any driving rules. Upon being dispatched officers
surrounded the defendant with numerous officers, whereas the defendant was isolated and
threatened. The arresting Officer Healy stated, "I am going to teach you a lesson because
you are messing with the wrong cop-1 win every time." Also, "I don't care who you are I
can ruin your day if I want to."
Further while §3501 (c) applies, §3501 itself should not trump Miranda as the
government argues. Miranda set out as a matter of Constitutional law the procedure that
must befollowedfor a confession to be held valid. Both the majority and the dissent
(Clark) agree that the decision in Miranda rests on the Fifth Amendment. For the
majority, Chief Justice Warren wrote,
"We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused or crime contains

inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the
exercise for those rights must be fully honored." Miranda v. Arizona, 344
U. S. 436,~(1966).
The court would be advised to look at the words of U.S. Attorney Janet Reno and
Solicitor General Seth Waxman: "Because the Miranda decision is of constitional
dimension, Congress may not legislate a contrary rule unless the Court was to overrule
Miranda We submit that principals of stare decisis do not favor the overruling of
Miranda, and we do not request the Court to take that step. In the thirty-six years since
that decision was handed down, it has become embedded in the law and defined thru the
decisions of this Court. If Miranda were to be overruled, this Court [the Supreme Court]
would have to disavow a long line of its cases..." This isfromthe Brief for the United
States, filed Feb. 28,2000, in the case ofDickerson v. United Stated, No. 99-5525, page
9.
To date no United States Attorney General has argued that Miranda is not the law of the
land. Congress does not have the power to overrule a Supreme Court opinion. That is
why §3501 has been ignored since its passage two years after Miranda.
Defendant argues that he was charged under Section 76-9-102, Utah Code Annotated
(1973), Disorderly Conduct. However subsection 76-9-102 (3) states, disorderly conduct
is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request by a person to desist
Otherwise it is an infraction." No person requested the Defendant to desist, the officer
nor the witness. Furthermore, this alleged offense was "mouthed", meaning that all
parties, complainant and the officers, did not hear anything. Only the complainant stated
that she saw the defendant mouth a threat. Officer Healy and Officer Bingham did not
hear or see any threatening behavior by the defendant. Thus, once again the arresting
officer based hisfindingson a third party for an infraction, not even a misdemeanor.

Under Section 77-17-3 the defendant argues that there is not sufficient evidence to put a
defendant to his defense, therefore, the court should order him discharged. Proving that
the defendant "mouthed" a comment beyond a reasonable doubt is impossible.

CONCLUSION
The defendant in this case has worked as a Paramedic/Firefighter for the past five
years. His duties included responding to local emergencies while operating an
ambulance. Also, this time last year he provided emergency care for one of the
largest correctional facilities in the State of California. He worked with law officers
on a daily basis without incident, ever. He returned to Utah on a leave of absence to
finish class work at BYU. While in Utah he encountered Officer Healy who
presented himself very unprofessionally. He was confrontational, disrespectful,
threatening, and rude. Officer Healy has a history of overbearing force, and
demonstrated his character during this incident.
For the reasons set forth above, the court should be ordered to dismiss the matter
rather than try the defendant. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. It
would not be in the interest of justice to prolong these matters.
DATED: JULY 2,2002

Respectfully submitted,

Tod^om/u^ndant

in Pro Per

